

INTRODUCTION

BULLS, APES, GENES, AND CLOUDS

BETWEEN 2008 AND 2011, members of the Spanish movement against cruelty toward animals gathered in several towns across the Iberian Peninsula to physically represent a wounded bull, filling its outline with their own bodies, painted in red and black (see fig. 11).

This image of the huge bull formed by human bodies, which only a bird's eye can fully appreciate (analyzed in detail in chapter 5), encapsulates a number of arguments and debates addressed in this book. It represents the relationship between concepts structuring national culture: the bull and the man. But contrary to the traditional opposition that a man establishes against the bull in the arena, this figure visualizes animality as an all-embracing reality of flesh in which both human and nonhuman animals are immersed. The red, bloody stain on the bull's back, formed by various humans, attracts attention to the vulnerability and pain that are sentient creatures' common predicament. Animals have been constructed culturally as "the other," and yet animality is a shared condition of humans and nonhumans. This performance communicates an attempt to modify Spanish culture by transforming human attitudes toward animals, in particular the cultural use of the bull, which is one of the main themes of this book and one of the most popular debates in the Spanish part of the Iberian Peninsula. This performance can be also read as a figure of an "affirmative biopolitics" that, according to Timothy Camp-




FIGURE 1.1

Activists of Fundacion Ecuanimal and WSPA-International in Bilbao

bell (2008, xxxviii), Roberto Esposito searches for in *Bíos* (2008). Affirmative biopolitics restrains the system of self-defense for the sake of preservation of as many forms of life as possible, without sacrificing any.

In the opening pages of his *Bíos*, Esposito sums up a number of thrilling stories from our present-day political stage, where some lives are destined to death so as to protect others, such as in the “humanitarian” bombardments of Afghanistan or Russian police killing 128 hostages in the process of freeing them in Dubrovka Theater in 2002. He also tells a terrifying story of the Chinese village of Donghu in the province of Henan, whose inhabitants sold the plasma of their own blood out of poverty and were in turn injected with blood infected with HIV. In this way, they were en masse condemned to death from AIDS, while rich buyers benefitted from their plasma, which was well tested in rich laboratories. Through these examples, Esposito defines negative biopolitics as verging on thanatopolitics, a politics of life nourished by death through a process of discrimination between the chosen and condemned. He writes, “Biopolitics has to do with that complex of mediations, oppositions, and dialectical operations that in an extended phase made possible the modern political order” (15). These “mediations, oppositions, and dialectical operations” involve language and are sensitive to historical circumstances that are different in each cultural setting. If the term “biopolitics” reflects the understanding that politics penetrates life, making it different from itself, culture penetrates both politics and life because concepts designating life and politics are heavily driven by cultural meanings. For this reason, it is important to investigate what particular shapes these “mediations, oppositions and dialectical operations” have taken in the given cultural context, and how they can vary to bring different results. This book retraces interactions between the hegemonic cultural discourses and biopolitics as well as heterodoxies in search of an alternative, less deadly, and more sustainable administration of life within the same culture.

Spanish deadly biopolitics has been represented symbolically in the spectacle of bullfighting, where subjectivity and humanity are defined against the animality of the bull and by the right to kill the animal. Matador, the national hero, is the one who kills. The performance in front of the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao has a radically different symbolic meaning, coinciding with Esposito’s idea of an “affirmative biopolitics.” The idea of life expressed by the shape of bull filled by human bodies seems to engage in a dialogue with his words: “Anything that lives needs to be thought in the unity of life—[which] means that no part of it can be destroyed in favor of another: every life is a form of life and every form refers to life” (194). In the huge figure of the bull in Bilbao, instead of two confronting individuals,

there is a community where individuals cooperate rather than compete, nurturing common life.

In Spanish literature, film, and theater of the last two centuries, there have always existed various alternative ways of portraying and valuing life, as opposed to those where *superior* humans were viewed as authorized to feed off and destroy “inferior” animals and humans. Writers, such as José Mariano de Larra, Leopoldo Alas (Clarín), Eguenio Noel, Luis Martín-Santos, as well as contemporaries, Juan Mayorga, Jorge Riechmann, Rosa Montero, and various others, who are dissatisfied with the existing relationships between human civilization and other forms of life, reveal in their works that the current treatment of nonhuman life rests on a great deal of ethical inconsistencies. In particular, they notice that the discrimination of “inferior” forms of life is a result of drawing ethical and political consequences from differences that are not ethically relevant, such as different capacities, for example. The ethical principle of respect for all life is empty since it is constantly compromised when it does not match with the interests of the powerful. Various political concepts, such as citizenship and sacrifice, as well as discursive strategies, such as pragmatism and the argument of economic gain, seem to justify the destruction of life. Mass media debates and activists’ campaigns in Spain since 1975, and most intensely since 2004, show the relevance of blurring the human-animal divides for the discourses on war and peace, torture, gender, economy, environment, climate change, and even for the future forms of life that may appear as a result of genetic engineering and synthetic biology.

The first and the basic opposition that modern biopolitics rests upon so as to establish the right to kill is the one between human and animal, and in Spain, that emblematic animal is the bull.¹ In the first chapter of this book, I analyze the modern debates about the use of the bull in the national culture, where the meaning of the human fight against the animal, thought of as a mark of human and particularly of Spanish superiority, dangerously slides to the other side, ending up by animalizing the human in Luis Buñuel’s and Pablo Berger’s visions. In terms of biopolitics, this chapter represents the transformation of the immune paradigm into the autoimmune one, whereas an obsessive rejection of otherness perceived in the animal leads to the destruction of oneself. The next two chapters focus on alternative and critical visions of the right to kill in both human/animal relations and in a strictly human domain in Spain, promoted by marginal intellectuals such as

1. See Stanley Brandes (2009) for a discussion of the emblematic animals of autonomic provinces of Spain.

Larra, Noel, and Martín-Santos, who often pay for the lack of accommodation in the national culture with personal failures and sacrifices. Yet these marginal intellectuals-activists manage to subvert the national culture discourses and provide alternative metaphors that have slowly led to significant cultural transformations. Chapter 4 analyzes the implications of varying figures of animalization and anthropomorphism for the construction of biopolitical discourses and for political action. It shows that both concepts of “humanity” and “animality” are arbitrary constructions that need to be revised before any biopolitical changes can be implemented. Further, I argue that paradoxically, in order to regain lost humanity, we may need to look at animals for inspiration. Chapter 5 returns to the cultural analysis of the performance at the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum and other performances, writing their meaning into the recent history of the Spanish Movement for Protection of Animals. Performances in public spaces by anticruelty organizations are analyzed as “ruptural performances” (Perucci, 2009, 1) that seek to challenge the prevalent values of society by creating a shock and suspending “automatism of perception” (Shklovsky, 1965, cit. by Perucci, 5) through defamiliarization. In connection to a shock, the vagueness of most successful ruptural performances allows them to establish a multiplicity of metaphorical associations that appeal to different viewers and build bridges to other new social movements. In Spain, most of the performances for the defense of animals establish connections to bullfighting as symbolic of the national identity, but they enact subversive versions of the inherited cultural scenarios, where the difference with which the archive (Taylor, 2003) is reenacted corresponds to the intended cultural transformation.

Chapter 6 focuses on one particular case of frame-bridging between the movement for the defense of animals and the antiwar movement during the times of the War on Terror. It analyzes the commentaries on torture published in *El País* and *La Vanguardia* during the years 2004–11 in two parallel debates: first, on bullfighting and human/animal relations, as Barcelona was preparing to manifest itself as an “anti-bullfighting” city (2004) and later on while debating the final ban on bullfighting (2010–11); second, on torture in the War on Terror when photographs from Abu Ghraib were first revealed (2003–4). It shows that as a result of the synergy between these two debates new meanings were coined that connected war and other forms of violence in the human domain to the violence exercised by humans on animals. While the first section of this chapter deals with articles in the press, in the second section I discuss Fernando Savater’s book, *Tauroética* (2011), against the animal rights movement; Jesús Mosterín’s pro-animal-rights text, *A favor de los*

toros (2010), which dialogues with Savater's²; and Juan Mayorga's play *La paz perpetua*, (2007), which is inspired by the photographs from Abu Ghraib.

The activists who painted their bodies in black to *be* the bull in front of Bilbao's Guggenheim Museum transform the modern use of this animal as human antagonist to that of a human living environment. At this point, the search for alternative biopolitics coincides with environmentalism. In this way, the meaning of environment is also transformed; it is formed by interconnected human and nonhuman bodies. This is the main theoretical framework of chapter 7. The connections between all the breathing bodies become the great matrix of life, whose predicament is "becoming with" each other, as in writings of Donna Haraway (2008, 4) and whose survival is conditioned by coexistence, as in theories by Timothy Morton (2007, 2010a, and 2010b). The activists in front of the Bilbao museum imagine the bull as home, an extension of their individual lives. In the environmental framework, the modern distinction between human and nonhuman (animals and other life in the environment) is blurred, implying fluid connections, overlapping, and mutual dependency and as a result a vision of culture that not only includes but is formed (this verb implies *agency*) by a number of nonhuman elements. The conceptual change leads to a transformation of attitude toward animals and toward human animality and also toward the surrounding environment. This is the vision of reality that emerges in Alejandro González Iñárritu's *Biutiful* (2010) and in Agustín Fernández Mallo's *Nocilla experience*, (2008) analyzed in the seventh chapter. In both the film and novel, balance of life is destructively mutated by human greed. *Biutiful* focuses on the corrupting influence of money, which has transformed the functioning of the universe, becoming its food and fiber, an addictive poison that needs to be dosed continuously to maintain the functioning of a world. The "narrativa transpoética" that *Nocilla experience* exemplifies is filled with hybrid artifacts: mixtures of human and nonhuman, present and past, real and imagined, all of which merge together as if through morphing. The novel challenges concepts that are arguably responsible for environmental disasters, such as the idea that humans are distinct from their environments.

The last chapter analyzes debates on the cutting edge biopolitical technologies such as genetic engineering and synthetic biology in the historical context of Spanish cultural discourses on science and in dialogue with a science fiction novel by Rosa Montero, *Lágrimas en la lluvia* (2011). Sainath Suryanarayanan, a co-author of this chapter, and I search for answers to the question

2. Large parts of the texts of Mosterín's and Savater's books were previously printed in the form of articles in newspapers, which is where both philosophers established a dialogue.

of why Spain appears systematically in various polls as the most enthusiastic supporter of biotechnology in Europe. We tentatively connect this fact with Spain's desire today to distance itself from its anti-Enlightenment discourses that separated the country from Europe by a self-proclaimed "difference." We notice, however, that in expressing enthusiasm towards biotechnology, Spain may be in fact repeating some of the old patterns that it wants to leave behind, namely subservience to the regimes of authority and power, nowadays represented by multinationals and scientific regulations. Our analyses of the debates on biotechnologies in the context of the new form of capitalism, called bioeconomy by Pavone (2012), lead us to distinguish between precautionary approaches to the cutting-edge technologies of life and emancipatory ones, recognizing their complex historical roots and conditionings.

The book opens with the figure of a bull, evoking its crucial place in passionate debates on Spanish national identity, masculinity, love, and death. In a brief history of anti-bullfighting thought, it counterposes bullfighting and anti-bullfighting worldviews in Spain and compares the cultural positioning of the intellectuals who supported each. But, apart from the bull, there are other key life figures, as well. Apes, such as Copito, the legendary white ape of the Barcelona zoo and a protagonist in Mayorga's theater, appear as the caricaturesque imitator of the human, mocking human superiority and bringing to the surface more similarities than differences. The debates analyzed in the book are prompted by the reconsideration of the right to kill and master life, which is constructed over the boundaries between human and nonhuman life. This questioning also occurs beyond the bullfighting contest, reflecting on hunting, farming, pets, zoos, and experiments performed on animals in scientific facilities, but also on torture performed on animalized humans and on the genetic modification of organisms whose life is turned into a form of capital.

The next part of this introduction aims to familiarize readers with theoretical frameworks employed in this book that transform discourses of life, blurring modern distinctions between the human and the nonhuman domains. The following part is divided into four sections (bulls, apes, genes, and clouds), and it sets the stage for an in-depth analysis of conceptual transformations presented in the subsequent chapters by summarizing recent debates in Spanish media on bullfighting, animal rights, genetic modifications of organisms, and the environment. The last section of the introduction constitutes a brief insight into Hispanism's complicity with the bullfighting culture. It characterizes discourses that dominate the field on human-animal relations and retraces their origins to the bullfighting worldview inherited from the Generation 27—which included writers Federico García Lorca,

Rafael Alberti, Luis Cernuda, all of whom were fascinated with bullfighting—but it also discusses works of the cultural critics whose voices aligned themselves alternatively.

There have been thousands of books written about bullfighting in Spain by its fans, but few by its critics. While a number of publications by U.S. Hispanists are devoted to the symbolism of bullfighting in literature, very few of these reflect on the significance of anti-bullfighting thought that during the last two centuries presented an alternative vision of a relationship between human and nonhuman life, as well as an alternative vision of life and bioethics in general. This book attempts to fill this lacuna, stressing the importance of these alternative visions for the transformation of ethics and politics of life on Earth in order to let it last a bit longer. It argues that the revision of the relations between human and nonhuman (or not-quite-human) lives is the first step in search for an alternative biopolitics.

LIFE

Life has always been divided not only into hierarchies of *taxa*: domains, kingdoms, families, orders, species, and more, where *homo sapiens* is only one of thousands of possibilities. It has been thought of in terms of physical processes, examined by biology, and also the so-called “meaning of life,” which has been mostly a human domain, analyzed by religions and humanities. It is hard to understand how the processes and their meanings could be considered separately, how they could be the subject matter of different disciplines. In this way, the human being has also been split in half—an animal body, tested in labs, but with a superior soul, analyzed by soul gurus. This division persisted even after the religious worldview was largely displaced by a cultural turn. Literary studies, art criticism, and philosophy displayed limited interest in overcoming the divide. The cultural, until recently, had been invariably understood as purely human, consisting of built environments and social relations. Humanities dealing with human cultural production were alienated from the material realities of the world surrounding and sustaining them. The “biopolitical turn” in social sciences and humanities (Campbell and Sitze, 2013, 4) has brought politics (and culture) together with biology, showing that they are intermingled and, in fact, inseparable because there is hardly any nonhuman life unaffected by humans, existing independently and in alienation from the global system of power fluxes. Biopolitics is a concept of the Anthropocene as it constitutes a realization that planet life is driven by human activities.

Recent discoveries of the rapid change in planet temperature announce the possibility of a dramatic global deterioration of planetary conditions that may bring catastrophic consequences. The realization that this change is man-made, that humans have become a geological force on the planet, gave rise to an assumption that we are now living in a new geological epoch called Anthropocene.³ This new geological placement requires an adjustment in the understanding of humanity and its relations with the nonhuman realm. We have become a decisive factor of the climate, comparable to oxygen or nitrogen, but decisively harmful, pushing the planet out of the Holocene equilibrium, which favored life. According to Nigel Clark (2011), as we acquire new knowledge of our relationship with what used to be considered beyond our influence but is no longer so (weather, natural catastrophes), humanities and social sciences should “return to earth” (iii). Clark urges humanists to become engaged in physical sciences research in environmental matters to “come to terms with the planet” and explore “how better we can live with other things and with each other—in the context of a deep elemental underpinning that is at once a source of profound insecurity” (v). In light of Clark’s writing, it is the humanities’ lack of engagement with the processes considered to be the domain of the sciences that may have contributed to the political and environmental crisis that we are facing today. (Science is too important to be left to scientists). On the other hand, it may be the humanists’ lack of engagement with the materiality of Earth and its life that makes the humanities seem irrelevant to those who work on the life’s hardware. Hence, it is through an engagement with the scientific domain of environmental processes that the humanities might get back on track in fulfilling its role in the contemporary world.

Theories by the late Michel Foucault (2003), Bruno Latour (1993), Donna Haraway (1991, 2008), Timothy Morton (2007, 2010a, 2010b, 2013), Martha Nussbaum (2009), Giorgio Agamben (2004), and Roberto Esposito (2008, 2013a, 2013b) reformulate the relationship between humans, animals, and other forms of life, and Jane Bennett (2010) questions even the habitual distinction between living and nonliving matter. For Foucault, in his famous essay “Right of Death and Power over Life” (1976), the power’s concern with life as biological existence is defining of modernity. It is when the politics begin to consciously regulate and master life for the purpose of the national well-being and prosperity (the stress on each of these two goals varies strongly in different moments of history) that the division between culture

3. The term has been coined by the Nobel Prize winner Paul Crutzen and has since been widely discussed by sciences, social sciences, and environmental humanities. See chapter 7 for more detail.

and nature, established vigorously by sciences, effectively decreases in reality. In this sense, biopolitics is in fact about life (human and nonhuman) growingly transformed and mastered by humans. As in Foucault's (2003) lectures gathered in *Society Must be Defended*, it is about the processes of the transformation of life into more than just life, crowned with the genetic modifications by biotechnology. This book tells the story of how the biopolitics in Spain evolves from the right to kill (as in bullfighting) to the right to transform life into something else, to use it for the purposes of economic growth by blowing it into new proportions through genetic manipulation. In parallel, it tells the story of the search for alternatives.

Latour notices the modern discourses' bluff in classifying nature and life as subjects of science and separate from the society that is the subject of politics, while politics, science, nature, and society are progressively more and more intertwined. In his widely quoted *We Have Never Been Modern* (1993), Latour criticizes modern social sciences for building false divides between nature and society, object and subject, as well as for creating various other divides across disciplines that blind us to the way the world really is. He postulates rethinking disciplinary discourses and divisions, and building new concepts to avoid those misleading separations. Latour's actor-network-theory (ANT) describes reality as a series of relations between humans, animals, plants, and objects that are viewed as equipped with agency (although not intentionality) and where processes occur as a result of accumulation of interactions. Actors, humans, and what Latour (1996, 2005) calls the nonhuman *actants* are equalized in his theory: "Actors are not conceived as fixed entities but as flows, as circulating objects, undergoing trials, and their stability, continuity, isotopy has to be obtained by other actions and other trials" (1996, 377). Latour comments on his theory as a poststructural inheritance extended to the real world, "extending the semiotic turn to this famous nature and this famous context it had bracketed out in the first place" (378).

Nature-culture is one of those concepts emerging from Latour's work that allows seeing humans and nonhumans linked functionally and materially as they have always been in life. Natureculture acquires new meanings and political applications in Donna Haraway's *When Species Meet* (2008) and is also significant for this book, which, inspired by Latour and Haraway, argues that seeing connections instead of separations between different forms of life is a fundamental step in the search for an alternative biopolitics, that can decrease suffering. In the feminist framework of Haraway, the concept of naturecultures challenges the human treatment of animals in scientific labs, serves to criticize science's attitude toward life in general, and works to

develop a political vision. In Haraway's politics a "situated knowledge" (1991, 183–202), conscious of its limitations and communicable through alliances, is preferable to an objective point of view from nowhere in a nonexistent God-point that is responsible for hierarchies and the subjugation of life. For Haraway, vulnerability of the knowing subject is a criterion of the validity of her knowledge. She proposes a transformative criticism that would refuse to disregard suffering, human and animal, and that in political terms would amount to substituting the capacity to control with the capacity to produce change, to nurture and empower others. For her, the production of innovating knowledge can be compared to—as indicated in the title of her article by the same name—"A Game of Cat's Cradle" (1994), where discourses are restructured by teams of thinkers, taking better and better shapes, like the threads tangled around the fingers of a group of girls who pass the game to each other in a courtyard. Haraway's belief that "knowledge is better from below" (1991, 190) connects to the intellectual agenda of the movement against cruelty for animals, which aims at the deconstruction of discourses justifying harm and the destruction of life.

As Latour and Haraway, Morton (2010a) criticizes the concept of "Nature" as distinct from culture and suggests substituting the vision of separate domains for the concept of "a mesh" (28, 33), which expresses the idea of ecological interdependence. The interdependence begins on the conceptual level where anything that exists acquires its identity as different from something else, as in Jacques Derrida's *Of Grammatology* (1967), and also etymologically because everything derives from other entities preceding it. Interdependence is also a result of the fact that all that exists consists of the same physical particles on some basic level. Similarly to Latour, Morton (2010a) compares the structure of life to that of language as imagined by Derrida, and he shows that both the language and the system of life-forms are characterized by an infinite and illogical multiplication of differences. Because they contain otherness, Morton calls all life-forms in the mesh "strange strangers," a name that is ethically and existentially consequential. "Strange strangers" (38) cause curiosity, bring respect, and demand hospitality. In spite of its strangeness, however, every nonhuman life-form is perceptibly familiar to humans because we have descended from it. This mixture of familiarity and difference that all life presents us creates, in Morton's view, the disquieting sensation of "uncanny" (2007a, 52).

The disquiet is not only caused by the ultimate impossibility to know "strange strangers," but it is also due to the invisibility of destructive processes taking place in the human environment that Morton (2013) calls "hyperobjects" and that are all-embracing and as unstoppable as climate

change, sixth great species extinction,⁴ and nuclear radiation that will go on for hundreds or even thousands of years after we are gone. Hyperobjects are interobjective because all life-forms are affected by them, but they are invisible. The planetary scale in which they unfold makes them, in spite of their imperceptibility, more real than what we are used to conceiving as real. They revert the order of the real, contributing further to postmodern art's quasi-fantastic aura. It may be due to the silent work of the hyperobjects that in various literary works and films in the twenty-first century, protagonists question the matrix of reality and of identity, discovering that what they had thought was obvious and commonsensical is a construction that often needs to be undone. These questionings often involve a reevaluation of both human and nonhuman life, as in the theater of Juan Mayorga, *Nocilla experience* by Agustín Fernández Mallo, *Lágrimas en la lluvia* by Rosa Montero, *Biutiful* by Alejandro González Iñárritu, all featured in this book but also in *Un lugar sin culpa* by José María Merino, *El año de Gracia* by Cristina Fernández Cubas, and others.

The meaning of "human" is altered by the new environmental consciousness, by the emerging biotechnologies of life that aspire to overcome the natural limits and also by the transformed notions of animal life. As a result of progressing destruction of the environment, apocalyptic scenarios announcing the end of our civilization appear in film and fiction with growing frequency. Different visions of the end provide for variances in the meaning for humanity. In his recent bestseller, *The World without Us* (2007), Alan Weisman imagines an Earth healing after humanity's "brief" intrusion on its surface. Humanity appears in this documentary-style work by imaginative reporting from the future as devoid of its spiritual glory due to all the damage it has done to other life forms. It is an object of current debate whether the ecological crisis that we are facing is just another opportunity for humans to overcome its difficulties or rather an announcement of the end of human progress and a limit to human freedom. Since the detrimental change of climactic conditions on Earth is the result of human production and consumption patterns, these patterns need to be transformed to insure that our planet remains habitable. Apart from the consumption of mineral fossils, an important change should take place in patterns of human consumption of animals. This is not only an important ethical issue but also an environmental one. For example, given that one fifth of methane in the atmosphere, one of the three gases contributing to the global warming, proceeds from animal hus-

4. See, for example, <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/dec/14/earth-faces-sixth-great-extinction-with-41-of-amphibians-set-to-go-the-way-of-the-dodo>.

bandry, eating meat may need to be abandoned or strongly limited. Other options for the future include production of in vitro meat and further genetic modifications of cattle (which has already been considerably transformed).⁵

HUMAN/ANIMAL LIFE AND LANGUAGE

Frederico García Lorca was among those who condemned the modern city economy based on the massive slaughter of animals. An apocalyptic vision of a polis whose financial success is nourished by the blood of millions of animals and the poor that moves the grids of the machines appears in *Poeta en Nueva York*, written between 1929 and 1930 and published for the first time in 1940, after the poet's death. The city's life rendered by the poems is underscored by the pain of all those invisible victims with whom the poet empathizes. The unfamiliarity with the highly industrialized American civilization causes Lorca, who loves bullfights in Andalucía, to become suddenly acutely aware of animal suffering and death in New York. In "Oficina y denuncia," (Office and Condemnation), Wall Street's calculus of gain reminds us of a genocide report, whose laconic form reflects on the indifference of a systemic killing, many years later called "Eternal Treblinka" by Charles Patterson (2002) and "Holocaust on Your Plate" by Nathan Sanza (2004):

Todos los días se matan en Nueva York
cuatro millones de patos,
cinco millones de cerdos,
dos mil palomas para el gusto de los agonizantes,
un millón de vacas,
un millón de corderos
y dos millones de gallos
que dejan los cielos hechos añicos.
(Lorca, 2009, "New York," *Poeta en Nueva York*, lines 16–23)

Every day New York slaughters
four million ducks,
five million pigs,
two thousand doves for the dying,

5. While for some, producing in vitro meat is a way to prevent the unnecessary death of animals, others argue that it is a waste of money and resources and that different kind of changes in redesigning food systems are needed.

one million cows,
 one million lambs
 and two million roosters
 that tear the sky to pieces.⁶

While for the Wall Street offices, the meaning of the numbers is that of an economic growth, for the poet it is the meaning of a massacre. The screams of killed animals pierce the heavens, but they are not heard in the modern city, which keeps all its killing hidden and its victims silenced in slaughterhouses whose walls are not transparent, but soundproof. Antonio Lafora (2004) writes that after Lorca returned from the trip where he visited a slaughterhouse, he began to reconsider his attitude toward bullfighting (256). Paul McCartney famously stated that “if slaughterhouses had glass walls, everybody would be vegetarian,” and afterwards PETA and various other organizations against cruelty toward animals placed videos on the Internet representing the horrific treatment of animals in farmhouses and of their slaughter, which had a great impact on many of us.

Descartes, who was deeply convinced of the superiority of the immaterial and spiritual soul over any manifestations of materiality, judged that since animals lacked consciousness, they could not suffer. For that reason it was perfectly fine to use animals “as any natural resource without moral scruple” (Steiner, 2005, 135). It only was an appreciation of purely physical pain as a voice of the body by the Enlightenment laical worldview, which became dominant during the following two centuries and made it possible to imagine that both humans and animals shared a common predicament. At the end of the eighteenth century, Jeremy Bentham (1789) pointed out that if animals suffered, ethics should also consider them.⁷ But it was only recently

6. My translation.

7. “The day has been—and I am sad to say in many places it is not yet past—in which the greater part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated by the law exactly upon the same footing, as, in England for example, the inferior races of animals are still. The day *may* come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withheld from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the *os sacrum* are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they *reason*? nor, Can they *talk*? but, Can they *suffer*?” (Bentham, 1789, chapter 17, section 1, footnote 2; <http://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/bentham/ipml/ipml.c16.s05.html>).

that scientific proof has been obtained that sentient animals (vertebrates and some nonvertebrates) feel degrees of pain comparable to humans. It was in the 1980s when research on animal pain was published that contributed important arguments to animal rights movement allegations. For example, in their article, "Pain, Suffering and Anxiety in Animals and Humans," David DeGracia and Andrew Rowan present scientific evidence that only confirms what was previously known as a matter of common sense, that vertebrates not only experience pain but also anxiety. In 1987, the journal *Florida Entomologist* published an article by Jeffrey Lockwood in which the author argues for existing evidence that insects should also be qualified as sentient and that their lives should be included in moral deliberations.⁸ The development of ideas on animal pain bring the realization that, as Bentham once suspected, in pain they are indeed like us, which in a world governed by empathy and consideration for suffering should lead, and to certain degree have led, to a change of practices. For example, after it was scientifically acknowledged that animals indeed feel pain, veterinarians began to use anesthesia while operating on animals, while this was not a common practice before the 1980s.⁹

The Spanish philosopher Fernando Savater states that if humans do not stop using animals as food and entertainment, these animals will disappear from our lives (2011, 46). The argument proceeds from Ted and Shemane Nugent's *Kill It and Grill It* (2002), which suggests that the best way to save a species from extinction is to start to eat it: "Then it will be managed—like chickens, like turkeys, like deer, like Canadian geese" (6) and will be blown up to reach record numbers. Savater similarly argues that various animal species would become extinct if humans had no use for them. In "Death by Birth," Alastair Hunt (2013) shows, however, that contemporary technologies of breeding turn animals into something else, keeping them alive only for killing purposes but then taking life away from them. Hunt claims that in factory farms, animals are born not to live but only to be killed. While a common sense point of view is that the meaning of animal agriculture is that of animal life, in fact, these animals have no life. They are already born dead because their birth does not just precede their death but constitutes a technology producing it. They are just condemned to "death *by birth*" in which birth itself kills or is a technique for killing. Hunt points out that the real

8. See also Lockwood's "Not to Harm a Fly" (1988).

9. Another reason animals were thought to lack consciousness and higher forms of sensibility was "Morgan's canon," which was very influential in biological sciences and stated: "In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher mental faculty, if it can be interpreted as the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale" (Tokarczuk, 2012, 35).

predicament of modern farm animals is indeed not being killed, but being born. Most of the animals bred in this way are not even able to copulate and multiply in a natural way, some cannot walk. To conclude, Hunt brings up Derrida's reflection on species extinction as paired with "extermination of life proper to animals" (2008, 26) by their forced birth in farm factories. Thus, he suggests that this species will be saved from extinction but will be also saved from life, being born "dead" as a "living corpses" awaiting consumption. Hunt hints at the existence of parallelisms within the biopolitics of human and animal lives. He evokes Hannah Arendt's reflection on totalitarianisms as "an insane mass manufacture of corpses" preceded by "the historically and politically intelligible preparation of living corpses" (2013, 447). (Are the futuristic dystopias such as *Matrix* a pure science fiction fantasy?)

Humanity and animality are two discursively opposed forms of life, which transcend each other in reality and in various aspects are identical. Agamben (2004) argues that the discursive attempts to separate humanity from animality, which he conceptualizes as the "anthropological machine," led to the construction of societies where those who are not sufficiently human are rejected or abandoned like animals (33–38). This happens because the division between humanity and animality runs not only outside but also within a human being and human society. In literature and film, this division is reflected by the rhetorical figure of animalization, which may be interpreted not only as the representation of humans as animals but rather more broadly as a construction of inferiority, which justifies the rejection of certain forms of life. The same idea appears in Haraway's *When Species Meet* (2008): "The discursive ties between the colonized, the enslaved, the non-citizen, and the animal—all reduced to type, all others to rational man, and all essential to his bright constitution—is the heart of racism and flourishes, lethally, in the entrails of humanism" (18).

To transform this state of things, according to Cary Wolfe (2010) our anthropocentric perspective needs to be overcome, and simultaneously, our categorizations of nonhumans and animals may need to be reconsidered. This task amounts to a revision of the concepts, metaphors, and discursive frames that order the world and justify the uses of power against the vulnerable life. As, following Wolfe, Georgina Dopico Black (2010) states in her article, "The Ban and the Bull: Cultural Studies, Animal Studies and Spain," that if we do not question the humanistic worldview that reproduces "mode of subjectivity" (236) within which the human is posed as superior, we will not be able to dismantle hierarchies of power and subjugation. The task of overcoming anthropocentrism is challenging because the language where our thinking is embedded reflects this anthropocentricity. Radically overcom-

ing anthropocentrism can be accomplished as a resignation of meaning and of language as the focus of subjectivity altogether as in Jorge Luis Borges's "El Inmortal" (The Immortal, 2011) or in *Planet of Apes* (1968) where in the imagined future humans indeed regain their animality and lose the capacity to speak. More moderately, it has to be limited to a revision of the ways of seeing, structured by concepts and metaphors that order the world. These efforts of reworking and revising our conceptual framework from within will not liberate us fully from an anthropocentric perspective but may rid us partially of speciesism, which works as an animalization that kills. Unless we stop thinking altogether we will never stop thinking like humans, but we may strive for a humanity that does not harm nonhuman life in the name of our alleged superiority but rather rejoices transcending toward the nonhuman perspectives with care, leading to an alternative biopolitics. This transformation of naturecultures through new metaphors occurs in highbrow philosophical essays, in literary works, in theater, in rock concerts, blogs, street happenings, publicity, press, and new laws and slowly results in new patterns of behavior. The struggles about concepts are in fact about reality.

IBERIAN DEBATES

BULLS

Achille Mbembe's essay, "Necropolitics," a particularly violent form of biopolitics, reflects on the defiance of death as a basis for various kinds of modern spirituality and politics. Mbembe argues that in certain modern discourses, originating in Hegel, "the human being truly becomes a subject—that is, separated from the animal—in the struggle and the work through which he or she confronts death (understood as violence or negativity)" (2013, 163–64). These discourses, where the sovereignty and power are achieved by living "as if death were not" (165) are intensely present in bullfighting culture and politics, characterized in the words of Lorca by "intimacy with death" (164). On the other hand, however, the bullfighting spectacle that symbolically evokes war and struggles for sovereignty is also painfully real. In the process, a live animal is being teased, poked, and killed so as to prove human superiority and, as a result, establish symbolically the human right to kill.

Even if the attitude toward bullfighting has significant political implications, the divide between bullfighting and anti-bullfighting Spain does not correspond to the "two Spains" from the famous poem by Antonio Machado; neither does it correspond to the divide between left and right. Almodóvar

was not the only leftist artist or intellectual who attempted to fit bullfighting into the new democratic status quo of post-Franco Spain. It can probably be argued that most publications on bullfighting during the first fifteen years after Franco's death were deeply involved in this undertaking. Timothy Mitchell's *Blood Sport* (1991) contains an exhaustive analysis of the most striking arguments for justifying bullfighting as part of the new status quo in democratic Spain. Enrique Gil Calvo (1989), Spanish sociologist and a journalist publishing regularly in *El País*, wrote a book to prove that bullfighting contributed to Spanish democracy as it played an important role in introducing Spain to the market economy. Mitchell sarcastically remarks that Gil Calvo went as far as to argue that the experience of the agony of a bull is a class-liberating event, and the rivalry among bullfighters represents a competition present in the capitalist market. From another perspective, José Bergamín in *La música callada del toreo* (The silent music of bullfighting, 1981), insisted on Lorca's idea that the sublime beauty of bullfighting is only accessible for true Spaniards, who have a uniquely Spanish taste for it. On a different note, Fernando Savater, who regularly publishes on bullfighting in *El País*, argued that bullfighting celebrates Western men's relationship with nature, which is the basis of our civilization and which he contrasted with "una especie de budismo que ha permeado la tradición ética del occidente" (a kind of Buddhism that recently transcended the Western tradition; cit. by Petit, 2010, n. pag.). Savater considers the animal rights movement as a threat to Western civilization because it challenges human superiority over animals, which is the foundation of this civilization (2011). Enrique Tierno Galván, City Major of Madrid (1979–86), important for his reconstruction of the city social space, and known for his support for the cultural movement *La Movida*, argued that bullfighting educated Spanish people socially and politically, developing "a collective act of faith . . . in the male of the species. . . . The bullfighter presents himself as the standard-bearer of manliness, and ratifies in each moment of the bullfight, that the faith in the certain kind of man, in which the public believes, makes a complete and continuing sense" (1988, 74–75). Continuing cultivation of this symbolic masculinity by a democratic socialist city mayor may have been connected to the fact that the institution of a democratic system had not immediately transformed the idea of citizenship and that, as some argue, the system remained in part, authoritarian. Perhaps the remaining authoritarianism prevented deeper changes in thinking and behavior so that various socialist politicians during the Transition were as devoted to bullfighting as their predecessors. The state continued sponsoring bullfighting because it was as useful for the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party's (PSOE) centralist and corrupted mode of

government as it had been for Franco's regime. Mosterín (2010) reminds us that the PSOE's vice-minister, Alfonso Guerra, brought his child to bullfights when it was illegal to do so and that in 1992 the minister of Interior Affairs, José Luis Corcuera, introduced a new *Reglamento de Espectáculos Taurinos* (Regulation of Bullfighting Spectacles), which allowed entrance of minors to the bullfighting ring, annulling the progressive law from 1929 by the dictator Primo de Rivera that had forbidden it. Similarly a probullfighting attitude was shown by PSOE's *Junta de Andalucía*, which promoted the popularity of bullfighting among secondary school students, implementing a program called *Cancelas abiertas* (Mosterín, 46). Manuel Vicent writes in his *Anti-tauromaquia* (2001) that these attitudes betrayed the original spirit of the foundational Revolutionary Manifesto of PSOE which, in 1917, demanded the abolishment of bullfighting. There is a debate whether bullfighting is a lower-class entertainment today or whether it is being manipulated to be viewed as such. This would serve as a way to justify state subventions that contribute to the financial growth of the bullfighting businesses. It would also help to proclaim it as a national heritage, which would protect it from autonomous governments' attempts to ban it.

Bullfighting, as do many other violent traditions, puts on stage the national politics of life in order to naturalize it and stimulate community bonding. The purpose of tradition is then to make the working of hierarchies and their tolls seem natural. Before the Catalan Parliament banned bullfighting in 2010, as well as during the three years afterward when the Popular Party arranged for bringing it back, among all the arguments in defense of bullfighting, citing it as a cultural tradition has been particularly prominent. Tradition has also been an argument for the defense of hunting and kosher slaughter, which results in a slow torturous death of animals. In the times of multiculturalism, tradition has become a political issue, and the European Union (EU), after various debates, did not force Spain to abolish bullfighting.¹⁰ There are, however, various questionable traditions that put in danger human and nonhuman life, many of which have been banned in modern times. Perhaps one of the most misunderstood interventions during the debates of the Catalan Parliament on 3 March 2010 was Mosterín's claim that the status of a Spanish cultural tradition should not necessarily protect bullfighting from ethical questioning as it does not protect from questioning customs belonging to other cultures such as clitoral mutilation (widely discussed in Spanish media due to growing immigration from Sub-Saharan Africa). The

10. See an analysis of those debates in chapter 5. The details can be also found in Pablo de Lora's *Justicia para los animales* (2003, 298–303).

anger of various media commentators caused by this comparison showed that even if different violent traditions are comparable for a philosopher, they are not necessarily considered to be so to interested parties.¹¹ Mosterín believes that ethical improvement involves constant rational questioning of those cultural practices that are harmful. This belief, however, may stand in opposition to the spirit of multiculturalism, in which tolerance or even support for differences in cultural practices is the ideal. For multiculturalists, a forceful integration that does not grant legal exceptions to traditional practices of different ethnic groups is a “destructive integration” (Shweder, 2003). Alert to the hazards of ethnocentrism, multiculturalists argue for abstaining from a moral judgment while observing and analyzing other cultures’ practices, even if these practices violate the moral rules of the observers’ worldview. This romantic respect for traditions, however, often ends up favoring the agendas of nationalistic regimes and overlooking individual suffering.

The critics of multiculturalism ask whether stoning of adulterous women, female genital mutilation, preventing children from attending schools, or torturing animals should indeed be tolerated because they are traditions. It is not always clear how conflicts between group interests and individual interests should be handled. While multiculturalists tend to give priority to group rights over individual rights, they define groups in terms of culture rather than gender or age. A famous article and then book by Susan Okin, *Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?* (1999), states that multicultural rights that grant exceptions to minority groups due to their alleged cultural differences are often detrimental for the women belonging to those minority groups. In dialogue with Okin, Spanish philosopher Paula Casal argues in “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Animals?” (2003) that cultures should not possess special rights to practice rituals that are harmful to animals. While in debates on multiculturalism “the desire to side with the underdog” (9) is often an argument for minority rights, in the context of ritual sacrifice, the underdog may literally be a dog.

In Spanish media, bullfighting has been defended as an integral and historically rooted part of Spanish culture and as a form of art (Grandes, 2010; Prada, 2009; Wolff, 2011; Savater, 2011). The interventions of those intellectuals show how successful the process of cultivating bullfighting as tradition for internalization of necropolitics has been. Prada, for example, claims that only

11. The idea that torture and monstrosities are in fact integral parts of culture and that their cultural character does not make them less abominable had appeared already in Mosterín’s *La cultura de la libertad* (2005) and was reiterated afterwards in *A favor de los toros* (2010), which contains a long list of torturous cultural practices: cranial deformations, body mutilations, addictions, wars, and terrorisms.

Catholics have access to the mystery of the bullfighting celebration because this religion gives them the sensibility to move naturally between life and death. For this reason, Prada believes that attacks against bullfighting are in fact against the Catholic religion. Similarly, Grandes (2011, n. pag.) calls bullfighting “a miracle” that only the chosen can see.

There is an obvious split among Spanish intellectuals and politicians. Jorge Riechmann, Jesús Mosterín, Paula Casal, Pablo de Lora, Rosa Montero, Rosa Regàs, Elvira Lindo, Manuel Vicent, Oscar Horta, Marta Tafalla, Juan José Millás, Antonio Muñoz Molina, and politicians such as Cristina Narbona, Joan Herrera, Francisco Garrido, and Pilar Rahola side with the bull. In addition, many of them associate *tauromaquia* since Ferdinand VII with tyranny, violent masculinity, and a primitive way of understanding our relation with nature, where human survival can only be guaranteed by the destruction of the nonhuman. The symbolic meaning of this traditional ritual is in their view incompatible with that of a democratic transformation that focuses on the elaboration of new models of masculinity, equitable participation, and more sustainable attitudes toward nature.

Advocates of bullfighting, however, also appeal to democracy. For example, in an article published in *El País*, Javier Marías (2010) compared the debated ban on bullfighting to the prohibition of smoking in public places or prohibition of gay bars, and he condemned both laws as limiting liberties and antidemocratic. Similarly, Savater claimed that the banning zeal of Catalans brings to mind the Inquisition and Franco’s censorship on forms of public life in his “Rebelión en la granja” (2010), and in *Tauroética* (2011), he compared it to a ban on abortion. Both these intellectuals denounced attempts to regulate citizens’ behavior through governmental prohibitions. Felix Ovejero, Pablo de Lora, and José Luis Martí (2010), engage with the argument that the state should not intervene in its citizens’ way of life and that, in other words, it should be forbidden to forbid. They remind the readers that every civil law is full of restrictions on individual freedom that are imposed for the sake of the protection of other’s freedom or for the sake of another greater good. If the life and suffering of an animal is not considered as an ethically relevant good, if in other words, animals’ lives do not matter or matter less than a human’s freedom to poke them, indeed such a prohibition does not make sense. In the case of granting ethical importance to animals’ lives, it is necessary to protect them by limiting human freedom to inflict pain on them.

Francis Wolff, French philosopher at the Sorbonne, in *Cincuenta razones para la defensa de los toros* (Fifty Reasons to Defend Bullfighting, 2011) mentions that bulls as a species would be extinct without bullfighting. According to Wolff, Gómez Pin (2009), and others, due to all the efforts to create good

conditions for bulls bred for bullfighting, this blood sport should be considered in line with the worldview concerned with ecological crisis. The terrains destined for bulls' breeding have turned to ecological reserves, rich in biodiversity. If bullfighting were banned, it would put an end to the ecological reserves and contribute to the extinction of these two hundred thousand bulls that are now alive in the reserve. According to this argument, bullfighting is in fact saving the lives of more bulls than it takes. Wolff (2011) and Savater (2011) attempt to show that cruel entertainments, such as bullfighting or hunting, are essential for the maintenance of life-filled enclaves that have not yet been taken over for agricultural or industrial purposes. The argument that bullfighting brings revenue was brought to the debates in the Catalan Parliament by Salvador Boix, the legal representative of the bullfighter, José Tomás, who testified that when Tomás appears in Barcelona, everyone earns more: taxi drivers, hotels, restaurants ("Violentos, torturadores, inmorales," n. pag.). All these arguments suggest that for animal life, their natural environments are only possible as long as they are rentable. It follows that nonhuman life has the right to exist as long as it is transformable into food, entertainment, or some other form of material resource. The visions of these two philosophers and of Boix are obviously reflecting on the dynamic of life under a neoliberal economy. It is surprising, however, that the philosophers find this state of things ethically satisfying.

When bullfighting is defended not as a tradition connected to Spanish spirituality but rather as a way to make money, Mbembe's vision of biopolitics, where spirituality and politics grow out of death, transcends to Warren Montag's "necro-economics." Based on the rereading of Adam Smith's description of the functioning of the market, Montag argues that Smith made a virtue out of greed by convincing his followers that private vices are public virtues and that the rich "in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity . . . are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessities of life, which would have been made had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants" (qtd. in Montag, 2013, 197). "The invisible hand," according to Montag, functions as a Providence controlled by God that justifies the worldly inequalities making us believe that the poor die happy and that acting in self-interest constitutes "the only true way to reason and justice" (203). This vision of the world where the market guarantees the universal good is partially responsible for the ease with which the biopolitical distinction between life worth sustaining and life left to let die or be killed is made.

In response to the argument that bullfighting brings material gain to Spaniards, de Lora (2003), Ovejero et al. (2010), Mosterín (2010b), and Vicent

(2001) state that it is not right to earn money at the expense of the suffering. Ovejero et al. counters the argument of species extinction stating that if we breed species just to torture and kill their members for entertainment purposes, it seems better that they become extinct. No individual in particular will suffer if the species becomes extinct because nonexistent life does not suffer. He claims that alternatively species could be preserved in existing reserves turned into national parks for their conservation. Although the main argument of the anti-bullfighting movement is that ethics are more important than financial gain, it is also true that that bullfighting has been heavily subsidized by the state, and possibly without these subsidies, it would not be profitable. The money used to subsidize bullfighting could be used to maintain ecological reserves in which bulls and other animals could live and die freely. According to Mosterín (2010b), the bullfighting industry received 600 million euros in subsidies from the Public Administration. Since both the 2000 and 2006 Instituto Gallup polls find that only 10 percent or less of all Spaniards consider themselves bullfighting fans, continuing to subsidize it seems unjustified (Gallup, 2002, "For a Bullfighting Free Europe," 2008; Lafora, 2004; and others).¹²

Bullfighting fans argue further that even if we cannot know for sure if the bull really likes bullfighting, the death in the ring after a happy, free life on the meadows must be preferable for him to a slaughterhouse that ends the lives of so many other animals. Various authors state that animal activists should be first concerned with farm factories, slaughterhouses, and even with fishing (Ansón, 2004; Wolff, 2011), not to mention the terrible conditions surround-

12. The 2006 Instituto Gallup poll of Spanish opinions on bullfighting has shown that "72.10% of Spaniards are not interested at all in bullfighting and just 7.40% are very interested; in Catalonia over 80% show no interest at all." (n. pag.). A very exact analysis of this and other polls on bullfighting can be found in Lafora (2004): 220–30. Even higher dislike of bullfighting emerges from the polls commissioned by International Humane Society; according to their website, "seventy-six percent oppose use of public funds to support the bullfighting industry." Further:

- Only 29 percent of the population support bullfighting (just 13 percent support it "strongly")
- Seventy-five percent of respondents said they hadn't attended a bullfight in the last five years
- Seven percent of respondents said they attended a bullfight "about once a year," compared with 20 percent who said they visited a museum/art exhibition; 19 percent who made theatre visits; and 12 percent who attended football matches
- Sixty-seven percent agree that children under 16 should not be allowed to attend bullfights. ("Bullfight Opinion Polls," 2013, n. pag.)

Even the polls commissioned by *El País* find that 60 percent of Spaniards do not like bullfighting ("Polls, most Spaniards do not like bullfighting," 2010).

ing the lives and deaths of millions of people all over the world due to poverty and wars (Cortina, 2009). Wolff pointedly notes that it is not the fact of the torture and killing of the bull that is questioned by the anti-bullfighting movement but rather its visibility. He suggests that hidden death would be even crueler for the animal (15).

Most Spanish animal rights activists agree that the systemic abuses of animals in farm factories and research facilities as well as their massive killings in slaughterhouses constitute a more important problem than bullfighting, but due to the invisibility of these practices, as well as the widespread belief throughout society in the need for eating meat, they constitute a far more difficult target than bullfighting, which occurs in front of everyone's eyes as entertainment. During the debates in the Catalan Parliament, Boix discussed the possibility that a bullfighting ban would lead to further demands made by the Animal Rights Movement as an argument against any concession: "¿Cerrarán luego las granjas de cerdos o pollos o prohibirán también la caza?" ("El debate," 2010, n. pag.) (Soon they will close the farm factories of chickens and pigs and forbid hunting). Most true animal rights activists indeed consider the ban of bullfighting as a first step on the way to questioning the practices of factory farming and slaughterhouses. For strategic reasons, however, this could not be stated during the debates on bullfighting. Bullfighting fans argued that slaughterhouses should be questioned before bullfighting in order to block all possible progress in the matter. This, nonetheless, has had a double edge to it. On one hand, as intended, in comparison with the horrors of the newborn chickens whose beaks are being cut off, the fight of the bulls seems beautiful. On the other hand, however, this argument has slowly turned attention to the hidden evils of today's meat industry.

APES

The question of the rights of humans and animals lies at the heart of biopolitics. Not all animal rights activists are fighting for animal rights, but most of them are convinced that some kind of legal framework is necessary for effective protection. Without the possibility of penalizing cruelty, it is hard to stop some people from torturing animals simply for fun. Antonio Lafora's *El trato de los animales en España* (The Treatment of Animals in Spain, 2004) contains a catalogue of cruelties committed every year by young males in search of entertainment. Without a legal framework, it is close to impossible to expect that animal farms invest in better conditions for chickens, cows, and pigs that are crowded into exceptionally small spaces, surrounded

by their own excrement, and unable to move. European Union norms have been applied vigorously for cows in 2007, for chickens in 2012, and for pigs in 2013. They regulate the density of animals in cages, the minimum and maximum temperature of the animals' housing, and the hygiene conditions that farm factories need to fulfill. As a penalty, those who have not met the new requirements are not able to export their products. In Spain, they are sold for less money and marked appropriately; for example, eggs are stained with a red dot (Maté, 2012, n. pag.).¹³ The widest and most interesting debate on the legal frameworks regulating animal (and human) existence was, however, motivated by the proposition to grant limited human rights to great apes.

The members of the *Proyecto Gran Simio* (Great Ape Project), internationally led by philosophers Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer and in Spain by Paula Casal and Jesús Mosterín, by asking for limited human rights for the nonhuman great apes (i.e., chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and bonobos) demand no more than protecting them from death, torture, and imprisonment. Casal (2012) argues that due to great similarities with human beings, these apes should be viewed as a newly discovered human race and treated accordingly. She argues that their human-like capacities predispose them to human-like suffering when they are imprisoned and tortured. Like humans, they have an extensive long-term memory and metacognitive capacities.¹⁴ The 2014 manifesto entitled "El quinto simio somos nosotros" (We Are the Fifth Ape) written by Paula Casal and Jorge Riechmann and signed by various other intellectuals internationally, argues that great apes possess all fifteen attributes defining a human, according to Joseph Fletcher (1966): intelligence, self-consciousness, self-control, sense of the time, sense of the future, sense of the past, capacity to establish relationships with others, capacity to take care of others and worry about them, communication skills, capacity to commit suicide, curiosity, perception and capacity to change, idiosyncrasy, and neo-cortex activity.

In 2006, Francisco Garrido, on behalf of the activists of the *Proyecto Gran Simio*, presented the Spanish Parliament with a resolution to grant great apes the right not to be killed, tortured, or arbitrarily imprisoned. The resolution was voted in favor, but because it has never been ratified, it has not become law. The most recent manifesto by the *Proyecto Gran Simio* from June 2014 again requests granting to the great apes a legal personhood, which in absence of the law protecting their rights, would help to argue for liberation of particular individuals at the court. The manifesto suggests that great apes

13. Some other legal changes and the anticruelty measures are discussed in chapter 6.

14. "Pensar acerca de pensar no está limitado a los humanos" Casal and Riechmann 2014.

deserve to be considered nonhuman persons more than corporations and thoughtfully connects the movement of empathy toward nonhuman animals to the ecological crisis experienced by the contemporary world. Casal and Riechmann write the following:

Por otra parte, sin dar un salto en la difusión social de valores como la biofilia y la sustentabilidad, las perspectivas de futuro de nuestra propia especie son muy sombrías en un mundo sometido a la severa crisis ecológico-social que hemos causado nosotros mismos. Ampliar la comunidad moral más allá de la barrera de nuestra especie, no sólo sobre la base del reconocimiento de capacidades de los grandes simios, sino también atendiendo a la obligación moral de respetar la vida de los animales sintientes, que son sujetos de su propia vida, y de no dañar a los seres que pueden ser dañados, supondría un avance decisivo en ese deseable cambio valorativo. (n. pag.)

On the other hand, if we do not popularize social values such as biophilia and sustainability, the perspective of the future of our own species is very grim in a world immersed in the severe crisis of ecological and social nature, caused by ourselves. Opening the moral community beyond our species, not only on the basis of the recognition of the capacities of the great apes, but also due to the moral obligation to respect all sentient animals who are subjects of their own lives, not to hurt any beings that can be hurt, would constitute substantial progress in this desired change of values.

Hardly anything exemplifies better the search for what Campbell calls “affirmative biopolitics” than these words of the two leading Spanish philosophers, but the legal aspects of the question have appeared more debatable than the ethical message of the manifesto. The resolutions and manifestos of the *Proyecto Gran Simio* prompted a debate on the human/animal divide in connection to the nature of rights that were in various cases considered as the unique prerogative of humans.

In his article “Derecho de los iguales” (The Law of the Equals, 2007), Carlos Pérez Vaquero, professor of constitutional law, sums up the debate on the limited human rights for great apes, pointing to the most frequently mentioned arguments. The most frequent reason to oppose granting rights has been, according to him, the great deal of work that remains on the human front. Humans whose rights are not respected will not benefit in any way, however, from great apes’ lack of rights. According to Pérez Vaquero, it is also unfair that concerns about animal well-being be postponed until all human problems are solved.

Pérez Vaquero presents the paradox that medical experiments are done with great apes because of their human similarity, while this very similarity is not used as an argument against using them in such experiments. The author ends his article suggesting that in the not-so-distant future, people will be surprised that there ever were any doubts about the great apes' rights in the same way that it is hard to believe for us today that some objected that women or other races deserved them.

Cortina (2009) argues that human beings have rights because they are aware of them. If they are not treated fairly, their self-esteem is lowered and they may become depressed. Cortina finds no reason why animals deserve rights because they are not responsible and cannot learn how to read. Casal and Riechmann (2014) explain that this imperfection is in fact a condition of a large part of humanity: "Los humanos con ciertas enfermedades, o en coma, carecen total o parcialmente de los atributos de las personas que en cambio exhiben, aunque en distinto grado, todos los homínidos o grandes simios" (n. pag.) (Humans with certain illnesses or in comas totally lack attributes of personhood with which all hominids or great apes are equipped to a different degree). The cognitive abilities of the great apes are above the level of very young children. Today we do not question children's rights to be free of torture and to fully develop their potential because they are irresponsible, do not understand politics, and cannot fulfill their duties. In Casal's (2012) argument, those who cannot defend themselves due to lack of capacities deserve a special protection from the society. In this aspect, animals are like children.¹⁵

In reference to Arendt, Hunt (2011) argues that animal rights are as natural as human. Reading Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), Hunt observes that she is uncomfortable with the phrase of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that states, "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights" because it places emphasis on the fact of birth and the natural existence rather than on "the artifice of speaking and acting as a member of an organized community, for example a citizen of a nation-state, something quite different from being a member of a biological species" (223). This biologicistic assumption of birth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights allows Hunt to argue, in contrast to Cortina (2009), that the platform of rights removes humans from the artificial circumstances

15. Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (2011) bring to equation the handicapped, the mentally ill and other kinds of people whose rights may vary depending on their capacities but are never totally taken away. These two authors propose that a law consider separately different kinds of animals (pets, denizens and wild animals) and grant them different sorts of legal status.

of society and abandons them into animal bodies. In Hunt's reading, if the birth is the only condition mentioned for the right to have rights, it is not the human but the animal who is the bearer of rights.

In the article entitled "The Perplexities of the Right of Man" (2013), Arendt reflects on human rights in a deeply pessimistic fashion, arguing that their innate character is in fact a fantasy or, in a more positive reading, a never-realized ideal. She points to the fact that Burke's criticism of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for the emptiness of its "Universal" character has been proven correct by history. According to Burke, it is the citizen and not the human who is the bearer of rights because the rights are guaranteed by the government of the nation to which the individual belongs. Arendt laments that people without a nation are unprotected as "savages" and destroyed as "beasts," which was the case of the Jews during the Holocaust. The Rights of Man, which humans acquire by birth and which are announced as "inalienable," are in fact "unenforceable" (85) outside of a nation. The philosopher pessimistically states: "We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights" (94). She notes that these groups often insist on their ethnic homogeneity because differences "arouse hatred, mistrust and discrimination" (94). By attracting readers' attention to the fact that equality as a platform of rights is a social construct and functions only in particular national contexts, Arendt establishes the rights of humans as a question of politics rather than nature. At the same time, however, she notes that the political and ethical ideal, which should ideally be realized in the future, is that these rights exist as if they were granted by nature and by birth, independently from citizenship. If that was so, however, or, when it becomes so, "whenever a civilization succeeds in eliminating or reducing to a minimum the dark background of a difference" (95), animals would bear rights as well.

Esposito similarly searches for a framework that would eliminate the difference that effectively erases the right to life. He writes that *sensu stricte* biopolitics is about *zoé* (pure animal life) rather than *bios* (political life), but he also argues that this distinction is false, because on the one hand there is no pure life, all life being transformed by human politics, but on the other there is the idea "of [the] impossibility of a true overcoming of the natural state [that politics] is anything but the negation of nature, the political is nothing else but the continuation of nature at another level and therefore destined to incorporate and reproduce nature's original characteristics" (2008, 17). In Esposito's view, this idea, although powerful, is not correct and his writings suggest that deconstructing the difference between *zoé* and *bios* may help construct a framework more friendly towards life.

Savater (2010) considers the animal rights movement as a great danger for human civilization, which, as he rightly states, “is based on mistreatment of animals” (n. pag). Granting animals the right to life and to be free from torture would radically change the human life style, taking away a large part of the privileges of those well-off humans. But as the reading of Arendt and Esposito shows, these privileges are held not only at the expense of animals but also at the expense of animalized humans and maintained together with “the dark background of difference” that is the basis of wars and ethnic cleansings. It is plausible to think that both humans and nonhumans would benefit in a civilization granting rights by birth. According to Riechmann (2003), the transformation of the system of food production that would be necessary if animals bear the right to life would help in solving not only world hunger problems but would also slow down climate change.¹⁶ If only ten to fifteen percent of the grain today consumed in husbandry was destined for human populations suffering from hunger, the consumption all over the world would increase and rise above the levels of malnutrition (25). Limiting or completely giving up husbandry would increase the amount of terrain available for crops that could feed more people, thus eliminating one of the main causes of poverty.¹⁷ According to Ron Bowman’s (2008) film titled *Six Degrees Can Change the World* consumption of cheeseburgers in the United States contributes more to global warming than all the American SUVs. Thus the suffering of animals is intimately connected with the suffering of humans, and they need to be targeted together. As Riechmann (2005 and elsewhere) argues, limiting or even completely stopping our consumption of meat is not only an ethical question but an environmental one, a *sine qua non* condition for stretching the duration of life on Earth unless, as some venture, the power of science can help to overcome the crises.¹⁸

GENES

If war, capital punishment, and other kinds of socially regulated killings are examples of necropolitics (Mbembe) and a market-regulated process of letting the poor die constitute an operating way of necro-economics (Montag,

16. See also Steinfeld et al. (2006).

17. Riechmann bases his statement on a number of English language studies. See also Thompson, *Spirit of the Soil* (1995); Blatz, *Ethics and Agriculture* (1990); Norton, “Agricultural Development” (1985).

18. The first hamburgers from in *vitro* meat grown in a lab have been already produced and consumed (“World’s First Lab-Grown Burger Is Eaten in London,” BBC, 2014).

2013), then bioeconomy, based on genetic modification, appears as a compulsory overgrowth of life that is transformed into something else (not-quite-life or more-than-life) to better function as capital. Even if most of the genetic experiments are carried out on plants and animals, humans do share the risks as their consumers and cohabitants and also because genetic modification becomes possible in humans. However, in all these forms of mastery over life by state, market, or science, there seems to be a common denominator.

In the very first pages of *Tiempo de silencio* (*Time of Silence*, 1962), Luis Martín-Santos compares laboratory genetic research to bullfighting, “como si fuera una lidia” (2) (as if it were a bullfight). Both the scientist and the bullfighter experience the thrill of being able to master life and death, both may fail to do so. Pedro, a young researcher from *Tiempo de silencio*, analyzed in chapter 3, wants to prove that viruses and not genes cause cancer, because then cancer could be prevented through immunizations. When he sees Madrid’s slums, however, he decides that poverty is the main factor of human illness and that perhaps he should be researching human suffering in this environmental context rather than leading laboratory experiments. Martín-Santos’s novel constructs an antideterministic, antigene discourse; it argues that it is not only genes that determine health but also people’s attitudes shaped by politics and language. Martín-Santos’s point of view has not become outdated in the twenty-first century when science has become capable of modifying genes of living organisms. A group of intellectuals such as Riechmann (2011b), Salvador López Arnal (2006), Carlos Amorín (2000), and Martínez Castillo (2008) argue, like Pedro from *Tiempo de silencio*, that instead of leading laboratory experiments on genes to overcome the crisis of life on earth, we should focus on protecting the life that has not been yet destroyed.

In the neoliberal framework, where the environmental problem is often reduced to the insufficiency of resources, biotechnology and the new discoveries related to DNA are thought to be able to infinitely stretch the capacity of the biosphere to feed a growing humanity. According to Sheenan and Tegart (1998) this means a new stage of capitalism where what is exploited is not human labor, but rather the generative and regenerative capacity of live organisms. Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are integrated into the cycle of production and commercialization of the market, revamping it through various crafty strategies.

For example, genetically modified salmon grow larger and can multiply all around the year, thus remedying the progressive destruction of fisheries. Genetically modified corn or rice, after just one cycle of growth, requires additional purchases of activators to retain its genetically modified (GM)

feature, forcing a close relationship between agriculture and chemical corporations and blurring the distinction between agricultural and industrial production. Genetically modified organisms constitute then not only an environmental risk and a risk to consumers' health but also a biopolitical risk of the privatization of life, which might be administered according to corporate financial interests rather than human needs.

Genetic modifications of crops, especially corn and soy, have been an object of debate for many years, and there has been no agreement in respect to their influence on human health. In spite of the pressure of the large multinational corporations and of the U.S. administration, most of the EU countries did not admit GMOs. Seven of them forbade cultivating genetically modified Monsanto corn. But in this aspect, Spain has been different again, as it possesses the greatest quantity of GMO crops in the EU (90 percent, according to Corinne Lepage, 2013). In Spain, GMOs have been cultivated since the late 1990s, when the PSOE government admitted Monsanto GM corn and allowed it to spread over 76,000 hectares, amounting to 21 percent of all corn in Spain ("España: El cultivo de maíz transgénico vs. ecológico," n.d., n. pag.).

Even though science cannot foresee the long-term consequences of GMOs on human health, the scientific character of GMOs has been for a number of Spanish intellectuals a sufficient argument to defend them, because science has been symbolically connected to progress previously denied to Spain because of past regimes. The desire to make up for lost time often leads to an uncritical enthusiasm for anything with a label of "science" or "progress" attached to it. Those who warn against excessive enthusiasm for everything that science condones are frequently accused of irrationality or of being retrograde. However, as some articles argue, unlike science funded by corporations, independent science has occasionally managed to show that the effects of GMOs on human and animal health could be very serious (Séralini, 2009; Lepage, 2013).¹⁹

While the debate on the genetic modification of animals and plants continues among philosophers, politicians, and scientists, a new issue has already arisen: genetic modification of humans. While the production of humanoids through cloning is still mainly a subject for science fiction, various types

19. According to Serralini's research GMO corn that is fed to chickens, cows, and pigs and that is also a common ingredient in sodas, sweets, and breads has produced the following results in experiments on rats: "Aumento de grasa en sangre (del 20% al 40%), de azúcar (10%), desajustes urinarios, problemas de riñones y de hígado, precisamente los órganos de desintoxicación." (n. pag.) (Increase of fat in blood from 20% to 40%, increase in sugar of 10%, urinary problems, problems with kidneys, and with liver, which are the organs of detoxification.)

of research in cutting-edge laboratories, carried out for medical purposes, could be also employed to “enhance” certain human capacities and to modify human bodies in many ways—the line between therapy and enhancement is blurry.

CLOUDS

A new study sponsored by NASA Goddard Space Flight Center and to soon be published in the peer-reviewed *Ecological Economics* shows a growing likelihood that the current civilization might collapse as soon as in the next fifteen years due to growing levels of economic stratification in the human population, which is directly linked to the overconsumption of resources. By investigating the dynamics of collapse in past civilizations, the study identified the most important factors, which explain the decline and converge on two salient features of social systems on their way to catastrophe: the stretching of resources beyond the associated ecosystem’s capacity and the stratification of the society into overconsuming elites and increasingly poor masses. The study puts into doubt theories that technological innovations may in fact solve these problems. Due to their ecological backpacks—that is, all the materials needed for their production—these innovations significantly raise the per capita consumption of resources, leading to further depletion of the planet and, in turn, further prompting the growth of poverty. The study ends, however, by advising that collapse can be still avoidable if the depletion is reduced to sustainable levels and resources are distributed in a more equitable fashion, but structural changes need to be made immediately.

This means an urgent need for an alternative biopolitics, a new way of administering life that would repair ecosystems at the expense of economic growth and profit. Programs and visions of such new politics of life appear in the works of economists focused on environmental justice and degrowth, initiated among many by the writings of Catalan economist Joan Martínez Alier (2003) and by the alternative economies that emerged in various Spanish localities as a reaction to this deep crisis. These are environmentalisms for the times of Anthropocene, conscious of human responsibility for the planet and interested in doing what is possible for survival in times of climate change, contamination, and loss of health.

Those who do not share the optimism of the science and technology enthusiasts have reason to worry. On 12 December 2013, *El País* published a forecast of the World Energy Outlook that warned that by 2035 CO₂ emissions would increase by another twenty percent, elevating the world’s

median temperature by almost four degrees, which could mean much greater increases in hotter areas (as well as lower temperatures in some colder areas), possibly making them inhabitable. The United Nations Conference on Climate Change in Durban in 2011 and the 2013 Warsaw Summit on Climate Change have brought little or no progress in this matter, and the most important environmental organizations, such as Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Action Aid, and Amigos de la Tierra, left the summit in protest. Juana Viúdez, reporting for *El País*, shared with her readers the mood of helplessness and disappointment. In an article entitled “Llegaremos a tiempo?” Lola Arpa Villalonga (2013) quotes Stephen Emmott’s supposition that if we found out that Earth would be hit by a huge asteroid, we would concentrate all resources and energies to prevent it. A change of climate will bring a comparable disaster by the end of the twenty-first century, but we cannot prevent it because, to echo Villalonga, in this case the problem is not external, but it is *us*, that we are reluctant to change. Climate change is a slow-motion disaster that still could be prevented to a certain extent but may not be due to our constant procrastination and inability to compromise our pleasures. It is thus a disaster that results from human culture, yet because it comes from the outside (i.e., the weather), it requires new strategies to confront it. To a great extent, the change may need the collaboration of the humanities and social sciences, as new discourses on the human and the human relation with the environment need to be elaborated. Riechmann (2001) stresses that humans should not imagine themselves as conquerors of nature—this is precisely the attitude that is leading to the destruction of Earth—but rather should realize their vulnerability and desperate dependence on the air, water, sun, sunlight, range of temperatures, stable ground, and soil that produces grain, all guaranteed by a particular chemical balance in the atmosphere that is now threatened. In other words, the nonhuman should appear not as an antagonist to be destroyed but rather as an extension of our physical body, our home, as in the performance in front of Bilbao’s Guggenheim Museum.

The principle of precaution that Riechmann (2011b), López Arnal (2006), and Amorín (2000) defend, arguing against a wide adoption of genetically modified crops, fish, and domestic animals, is one of the main principles of ecological thinking. Because of this, it is in a certain sense a conservative attitude in contrast to the apparently progressive enthusiasm for novelty, and this leads to criticism of the environmental movement. For example, Martín Caparrós (2010) declares in an interview with Ima Sanchís that “el ecologismo es una forma presentable, cool, elegante, del conservadurismo” (n. pag.) (environmentalism is a form of conservative attitude, presented as cool

and elegant), and he argues that it transforms the religious discourse on an apocalypse and mobilizes people to prevent distant dangers while there are many immediate ones that they thus neglect. Indeed, the question of time, the indefinite future of the announced catastrophe—since the clouds are not yet permanently over one's head—has been one of the greatest challenges for mobilizing environmental action. In certain parts of the world, however, the future has already arrived, and clouds have exploded, producing death and destruction. In his dramatic speech during the United Nations Climate Summit, Filipino delegate Yeb Sano, still emotionally affected by the 2013 hurricane that devastated his country, turned to those who think that climate change is a question for the future:

I dare you to get off your ivory tower and away from the comfort of your armchair. I dare you to go to the islands of the Pacific, the islands of the Caribbean and the islands of the Indian Ocean and see the impact of rising sea levels . . . where climate change has likewise become a matter of life and death as food and water become scarce. . . . If that is not enough, you may want to pay a visit to the Philippines right now. (Sano, 2013)

As this talk shows, environmentalism and the alternative biopolitics that it mandates means not only protecting the future, but also dealing with the aftermath of catastrophes that have already happened and preparing for those that are on their way. As Morton and Rosa Montero state independently, in the global ecological vision everything appears interconnected through the material particles and the information. All and each action and event has an impact on the general state of things. Ecological vision is overtly rational in its precautionary approach, but it is also quasi-marvelous in its perception of all life as if it formed part of one complex single living organism, as in J. E. Lovelock's *Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth* (1987). Ecological vision requires the capacity to skillfully imagine the movement between the bird's view and a view from below, a dialogic connection between the big picture and a localized predicament where individual and local are partaking in the processes taking shape in a planetary scale and where there is a correspondence between each cell and the body of the world. The seemingly irrational fear that a wound of the smallest critter can contribute to the loss of equilibrium on the planet may in fact be justified.

The greatest wound and largest environmental disaster that awoke ecological awareness in Spain was the oil spill of 20 million U.S. gallons from the oil tanker *Prestige* just off the coast of Galicia in 2002. It caused “la marea negra” (a black tide) as the whole sea was covered with a thick layer of black

oil that killed hundreds of thousands of fish, birds, and other creatures. The polluted coast and destruction of life produced a sense of loss, mourning, and a consciousness of a threat, and it was compared in Fernández Mallo's *Nocilla experience* (2008) to the end of the world. The disaster caused despair, but it also mobilized a great number of volunteers who came to clean the oil from all over the Iberian Peninsula and abroad. Juan López de Uralde (2010) called them "la marea blanca" (53; a white tide), since most volunteers wore white cloths, sharply contrasting with the black oil. Activists gathered around the platform "Nunca Mais," which called for protests attended by thousands of people and demanded that Galicia be recognized as a catastrophe zone and for a disaster prevention system to stop further catastrophes from occurring. But it also mobilized an awareness that black tides will keep occurring as long as energy production depends on the oil and thus provided an incentive to search for alternative sources of energy.

José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's government (2004–11) significantly subsidized Spanish production of solar photovoltaic panels, leading to a boom in its implementation. Spain moved to be the fourth largest manufacturer of world solar power, and it became the world leader in concentrated solar power (CSP). In 2012 Spain was also the world's fourth largest provider of wind power, and the wind farms in the mountains have slowly become a part of the Iberian countryside. Wind is the third most important source of energy in the country, and as of 2012, it has covered sixteen percent of the demand. As a result of the economic crisis and subsequent change of government in 2011, however, the subsidies for solar panel production were removed, retroactively leading to great losses as well as many lawsuits where the legality of such changes was questioned. Several hundreds of photovoltaic plant operators faced bankruptcy. The economic and political crisis has not proved to be an opportunity for development of those technologies that were not promising an immediate profit but rather only an environmental benefit. It has stopped funding research and promoting the implementation of solar energy. The crisis became an excuse to intensify the economic measures and processes that are responsible for the collapse of the international economy and the destruction of the environment. In that sense it had begun earlier than 2008.

In her *Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason* (2002), Val Plumwood employs the metaphor of the Titanic to talk about "the technological hubris" (1) of contemporary capitalism that receives the warning of an iceberg, but instead of slowing down, it decides to go "Full Speed Ahead" (1) in order to avoid a loss for the business. Riechmann believes that it is not possible to stop the destruction of Earth given existing structures of gov-

ernment and property. While alarming discourses of environmentalists have not brought sufficient change, sociologists have already identified the phenomenon of “ecofatigue”—coined by professor of psychology José Antonio Corraliza and popularized by media (Montalbán, 2011)—which refers to the weariness many feel with all these announcements of future catastrophes. In this sense, the economic crisis may have proven to be an opportunity for change as it prompted the emergence of a number of alternative movements that slowly renewed political consciousness.

On 15 May 2011, a protest movement known as the “Indignados” (Outraged) occupied the central Plaza del Sol of Madrid, where they stayed debating and organizing themselves for several weeks. Various participants remain active in regularly meeting assemblies even today. The Indignados’s manifestos ask for the development of green energies, closing of nuclear plants, sustainable means of transportation, and development of community life and public spaces. In various publications coming from the movement, the general failure of the system has been diagnosed. The *Manifiesto of Indignados* from 15 May 2011 reads as follows:

El obsoleto y antinatural modelo económico vigente bloquea la maquinaria social en una espiral que se consume a sí misma, enriqueciendo a unos pocos y sumiendo en la pobreza y la escasez al resto. Hasta el colapso. La voluntad y el fin del sistema es la acumulación del dinero, primándola por encima de la eficacia y del bienestar de la sociedad. Despilfarrando recursos, destruyendo el planeta, generando el desempleo y consumidores infelices.

(10)

The current economic model, obsolete and unnatural, blocks the social mechanism in a spiral that consumes itself. While few get rich, the rest sink into poverty. It will collapse. The will and the end of this system is an accumulation of money, which is more important than the efficacy and well-being of society. It wastes resources, destroys the planet, causes unemployment and unhappy consumers.

The Indignados have been one of the first ample social movements on the Iberian Peninsula, displaying an awareness that the decline in quality of life experienced by many is not only due to the neoliberal economy’s failure to distribute wealth in a fair way but also to its destruction of the environment, especially in the poorer communities. There is a widely spread consciousness that injustice is responsible not only for the social crisis but also for the environmental one, consequently making justice an environmental value.

Also, Spain has been home to the degrowth economic theories that argue for the need to stop the infinite economic growth postulated by neoliberal capitalism.²⁰ In March 2010, Barcelona hosted an International Degrowth Conference with five hundred participants from all over the world. The basic assumption of the movement is that infinite growth is impossible due to the limited amount of resources on Earth. According to Peter Brown (2012), “Degrowth is an attempt to decolonize the mind” and make people see that our consumption ends up consuming our lives. Joan Martínez Alier (2003) argues that Western world societies have a false image of the economy as based on Growth Domestic Products (GDPs), which does not take into consideration the damages caused to the environment—including human health—by economic growth (externalities). According to Martínez Alier, the real economy is that which deals with energy sources and the environment. The Indignados have been inspired by these debates on alternative economy, which are also entering academic curricula in Spanish Universities.²¹

The Indignados movement has been criticized for its lack of a political program. Such a program, however, could not have existed in the movement’s initial moments because it rejected the political strategies and conceptual frameworks that were available, instead opting to work toward revising the most elementary forms of politics and the unquestioned truths of a capitalist economy. The Indignados called alternatively themselves “Democracia Real Ya” (Real Democracy Now) and have attempted to develop a local, organic, participative democracy as an alternative to the political system that disappointed them. Among alternative economic projects, they have proposed to limit the workweek to only thirty hours not only to provide for more jobs but also to give people time for political participation. As the discontent driving millions of Indignados connects to alternative discourses of other new social movements, a network of new visions of ethics and politics of life synergizes, and a change has begun to happen.

In Paula Casal’s *Martina y el mar* (2007), a teenage Martina gets lost on a beach and is taken care of by Captain Gunnar, who shows her his boat and tells her about dolphins and whales. Martina falls asleep on board the ship, and in her dreams, she hears the voices of whales that got stuck in ice and are calling for help. In Martina’s dream, they are in the North Pole where it is even

20. Riechmann, deeply engaged in these debates, prefers the term “autoncontención” (self-containment), which implies the need for self-limiting consumption on the individual as well as the systemic level, including the nationalization of banks and various other parts of the economy.

21. In his blog, *tratarde.org*, during the last few months of 2013, Riechmann announced three courses on degrowth and on ecological economy that were offered for free.

colder than usual since the sky is covered by thick contaminated clouds that had been formed in the excessively heated areas of the Earth. While as a result of climate change, parts of Earth are becoming very hot, other places become even colder. Animals stuck in ice die a slow painful death, crying with the full strength of their lungs. But it is only very few that can hear them. As in his poetic oversensitivity, Lorca heard the piercing bellowing of mechanically milked cows in the factory farms hidden from New York dwellers, Martina in her dreams hears the whales calling for help from the distant North Pole. If Araujo is right, and all the important changes are brought by movements that were marginal at first, perhaps Lorca's and Martina's sensitivity will spread, and important changes will be implemented by new generations.

HISPANISM AND NECROPOETICS OF BULLFIGHTING

Some of the hardest people to reach are those who work to a well-developed theoretical framework, with whose assumptions your findings do not concur.

—George Monbiot

Among the various examples of writings by great artists and intellectuals of the Second Republic whose ideas have become a sort of New Testament of Hispanism is Lorca. This inspiration, however, didn't come from Lorca's complaints about New York slaughterhouses but rather his enthusiasm for the particular Spanish capacity to move between life and death and to give life to death, as is played out in the bullfighting ring in his *La teoría y el juego del duende* (Theory and Play of the Duende, 1932) and other works. Lorca's excitement about life in death provides for a series of poems and theater dramas of thrilling beauty. It is also to an extent responsible for Hispanists' approval for bullfighting. Lorca wrote poems about bullfighters and bullfights, and declared bullfighting to be the human treasure of Spain, which should be exploited by artists and writers. The artists and scholars, admiring Lorca, have followed his call. There are plenty of scholarly articles and books analyzing the meaning of death and of bullfighting for Lorca and other poets of his generation—many of which are far from critical toward the necropoetics of those artists, which aestheticizes the necropolitics of the state.²²

22. See, for example, *The Tragic Myth; Lorca and cante hondo* by Edward F. Stanton, The University Press of Kentucky, 1978; or Carl W. Cobb, *The Bullfighter Sánchez Mejías as Elegized by Lorca, Alberti and Diego*, Spanish Literature Publications, 1993, as well as its review by Salvatore J. Poeta in *Revista Hispánica Moderna*.

A Lorca-like vision of bullfighting's relation to Spanish culture appears in *Música callada del toreo* (1989) and other works by José Bergamín, a great friend of Lorca, who survived him by many years, was similarly fond of bullfighting, and was a key intermediary between the world of literature and scholarship during the early years of the postwar Hispanism. During the time of intense debate on bullfighting, prompted by Spain's entrance into the EU, Bergamín, just as Lorca, connected bullfighting to the Gypsy way of being. Just as Lorca (and also, more recently, Prada and Grandes), he described bullfighting art as understandable only to those equipped with a special sensibility, and he connected this sensibility to the spiritual superiority of a quasi-religious trance that bullfighting elicited for him, "este estado de posesión divina—o diabólica" (30) (this state of divine or diabolic possession). For Bergamín, the Andalusian bullfighting style defines Spanishness together with the contradictory spirits of Kierkegaardian Christianity, Don Quijote, *cante hondo*, flamenco, and the baroque.

Bergamín, just as Lorca, belonged to the famous Generation 27. He was also a disciple of Miguel de Unamuno and a political activist of the Spanish Second Republic. During the Spanish Civil War, he presided over Alianza de Intelectuales Antifascistas (Alliance of Antifascist Intellectuals) and, in besieged Madrid, next to Rafael Alberti, Miguel Hernández, Luis Cernuda, Manuel Altoaguirre, and Vicente Aleixandre, published in *El mono azul*. During his exile in Mexico, he founded the journal *España peregrina* as well as a publishing house, named Seneca, which printed literary and critical works forbidden in Franco's Spain. These contained the paradigms of today's Hispanism in which we are still to some extent located. Bergamín himself was adopted as an emissary of Spanish culture by the first generations of post-war American Hispanists. In 1941, for example, David Lord wrote in *Books Abroad* an homage to Bergamín, praising Bergamín's physical appearance, his Catholicism, as well as his work on "Spanish music, drama and the authentic Spanish sport of bullfighting" (409). He presented the Spanish exile as a living example of that spiritual superiority of Spain over the rest of the Western world that Lorca and Bergamín had voiced and that still resounds in many articles in the field. In the words of Lord:

There is probably no adequate historical study of the problem, owing to the fact that the Western world largely denied its existence, but the present crisis of society is bringing the matter again to the forefront, and Spain's role in the spiritual development of Western men will soon become widely recognized.

... It is as a bearer of ... [the] spiritual health of Spain that Bergamín comes now to the new world. (407)

Once again, for Lord as for Lorca and Bergamín, bullfighting is the truest expression of Spanish soul.

Sebastiaan Faber (2005) analyzes the ideologies of three journals that had an important role in the foundation of the postwar U.S. Hispanism: *Revista Iberoamericana*, *Romance*, and *España peregrina*, the latter founded by Bergamín. He notices that in spite of their differences, they all share the belief in the spiritual mission that originates in the “madre patria” and that represents a set of values “without which the world would not be able to survive” (82). Not so radically different is Carlos Fuentes’s vision in *El espejo enterrado* (The Buried Mirror, 1997), which the University of Wisconsin–Madison, together with various other American universities, still uses as a textbook to teach its Hispanic cultures course. Fuentes, like Bergamín, claims that the essence of Hispanic civilization is intimately connected to the symbolism of the bull and bullfighting. The spirituality that bullfighting represents for Fuentes reveals the *true* relation between human and nonhuman nature, as opposed to the hypocritical concealment of this relation in Anglo-Saxon cultures.

The opposition of the “spiritual health of Spain” to the crisis of Western civilization that Lord brings into his article on Bergamín appears also in Américo Castro’s inaugural lecture at Princeton in December 1940, entitled “The Meaning of Spanish Civilization,” where this famous writer states that “the way that Spanish life has realized itself in history is different from what we observe in other great peoples of the West” in that instead of material and technological development, it opted for confronting “the ultimate problems of life and death” (Margaretten and Rubia Barcia, 1976, 25). Later he adds: “To live or to die are for [the Spaniard] equivalent points of departure . . . [and] today it seems certain that only those countries able to face death will be able to survive” (39). In 1940, Castro lectures on “the crisis of the European civilization,” (Ibid, 26) which he supposes might be brought about by its excessively materialistic and technocratic tendencies, and he suggests that the cure can be found in the Spanish way of life. Once again the vision of Spanish culture’s superiority, due to its intimate relation with death, is presented as its most relevant feature. Gonzalo Pasamar (2010), basing his assumption on John Beverly’s research, claims that Castro’s influence in U.S. academia and especially in U.S. Hispanism was enormous due to his affinity with “the primary assumption of the American liberalism during the cold war” (218). According to Pasamar, “Castro’s influence must be regarded as an ideology of North American academic Hispanism” (218). This influence was so strong because Castro provided American Hispanists with an updated version of Spanish history that was, however, framed and phrased by concepts that were crucial for his vision of Spanish culture as not materially oriented but with a spirituality focused on death.

If, according to Mbembe, Hegel defines the “life of the Spirit” forming a human subject as different from an animal in terms of “upholding the work of Death” (2013, 164) in a struggle against it, it may be argued that Spanish bullfighting is the most classical performance of necropolitics’ spirituality. Additionally, Hispanists defining Spanish national spirituality as enthusiastic acceptance and commitment to necropolitics are themselves committed to these critical conceptualizations. Intellectuals willing to serve national culture develop discourses that reveal interiorization of the state necropolitics that may be deeper than their commitment to a particular form of the state. Lorca, Bergamín, Castro, as well as Luis Cernuda, Rafael Alberti, and so many others were abhorred by the violence of the state but attracted by the sublime and spiritual allure of death caused by this violence. They did not even see this as an inconsistency or take note of the fact that this spirituality of necropolitics helps to build, maintain, and justify oppressive regimes that kill and let die. The cultivation of this spirituality among Hispanists may be the reason for relatively little interest in alternative biopolitics in our field. Alternative perspectives that propose to protect life, like those found in animal studies or environmental studies, seem not essentially Spanish.

A celebratory approach to heroic death encounters such as is found in a bullring still appears in literary criticism published in professional journals in the twenty-first century. For example, María G. Hernández, in her article “Matador: El deseo transgresivo en Rafael Alberti and Pedro Almodóvar” (Matador: Transgressive Desire in Rafael Alberti and Pedro Almodóvar, 2002) published in *Lenguaje y Textos*, not only aestheticizes the violence of the bullfight but also considers the passions expressed in bullfighting as an answer to ethical problems:

Ellos usan la irracionalidad como arma arrojada contra una moral en crisis. Rompen las barreras que separan lo racional de lo irracional para conducirnos a una intrahistoria donde se alberga el deseo, los sueños y la pasión. Alberti con su poema “Matador” y Almodóvar con su película del mismo nombre dan cuenta de una fuerza pasional sin encasillamientos. Los roles fijos desaparecen y sólo existe el fluir de la vida y el arte. Los papeles del toro y el torero se intercambian: el toro mata al torero, el toro es mujer, el toro es hombre, el matador es animal y, al final, toda diferencia y barrera entre lo creíble e increíble se disuelve en la estocada que mata. De esta manera, este deseo irracional, constructivo o destructivo, que persigue la plenitud, encuentra su profunda realidad en la muerte. (65)

They use irrationality as a weapon against moral crisis. They break barriers that separate the rational and the irrational in order to conduct us into an

“intrahistory” inhabited by desires, dreams and passions. Alberti with his poem “Matador” and Almodóvar in his film with the same title tell us about limitless passions. The fixed roles disappear and there is only a flow of life and art. The roles of the bull and bullfighter switch: the bull kills the bullfighter, the bull is a woman, the bull is a man, the matador is an animal and, in the end, all differences and barriers between the credible and incredible are dissolved in the thrust of the sword that kills. In this way the irrational desire, constructive or destructive, that peruses the plenitude, finds its profound reality in death.

This long quote reflects the vision of the particularity of Spanish culture where death is represented as an erotic object, a realm of plenitude, and the ultimate reality that makes earthly existence irrelevant. Hernández’s analysis arises directly from the cultural theory by Lorca as well as Alberti’s text. We can trace the origins of Hernández’s discourse on “moral crisis” resolved through irrational passions leading to death in Castro’s writings on the “spiritual health of Spain,” as opposed to the “crisis of the society” in the Western world (“The Meaning of Spanish Civilization,” 1942/1977). The interpretation of Almodóvar’s *Matador*, however, seems to be insensitive to the fact that his representation of bullfighting in the film lies halfway between parody and eulogy.

In Hernández’s analysis supplied by the passage above, all differences, including those between human and nonhuman, feminine and masculine, the victim and the victimizer, even the constructive and the deconstructive, dissolve in the symbolic arena of death, rendering all possible inequalities and injustices irrelevant. This irrelevance of injustice and inequalities, as Hernández herself notes, was inherent in Unamuno’s idea of *intrahistoria*, which envisions a life that persists on the back burner, mostly in poverty and uneducated, unaffected by the events that push history forward, as an essence of the national culture.²³ As a result, Unamuno suggests that no action, no intervention, and no reform are necessary to improve the life of those people. Thus even if he claims to dislike the performance of necropolitics in bullfighting, in his philosophy, Unamuno is also focused on death although he favors dying peacefully, which is made possible through the dying of necro-economics.

According to Terry Eagleton’s widely read *Literary Theory* (1983), literature and literary criticism in the modern nation take on the connected function of religion and entertainment. Eagleton presents the foundation of

23. See, for example, the characterization of the life of *el pueblo* (people) as connected to land, almost a part of it, never changing, and far away from the worldly politics in *Don Manuel Bueno, mártir* (1933) or in “Las hurdes” (1914).

English literary criticism as a substitute for religion in its mission of turning people, especially the middle and lower classes, into good citizens. That mission was to be accomplished through propagating literature as ideology, creating symbolic ties to both the state, with its right to violence, and the nation, with its need to be defended. In this early stage, the symbol, as it is defined in Romantic aesthetic theory, “becomes the panacea for all problems. Within it, a whole set of conflicts which were felt to be insoluble in ordinary life—between subject and object, the universal and the particular, the sensuous and the conceptual, material and spiritual, order and spontaneity—could be magically resolved” (19). Nation-building has been a foundational mission of literary criticism not only in England but, in a different context, also in nineteenth and early twentieth-century Spain as well as after the Spanish Civil War, both in Spain and in exile. In its nation-building mission, literary criticism largely recurs to symbols. Symbols, as Eagleton explains, are crucial for nationalistic identifications which override real cultural and class differences. Symbols subtly divert readers’ attention from the immediate realms of life and direct it toward the transcendental domains, where all become one. This is what happens in bullfighting, and it is exactly the process described and enacted in Hernández’s passage quoted earlier. Bullfighting, as the all-encompassing symbolic “difference” of Spanishness, resolves tensions between real differences of life (also diverse cultural forms of Iberian life as well as the conflicts of history) in “the deep reality of death,” which constitutes the foundation of the “deep tradition” (65). Given its symbolic reach, it is not surprising that Hispanism displays a fascination with the necropoetics of bullfighting where all differences resolve in death and a unified nation emerges as a result.

As a mark of difference, a number of deeply reverential analyses of bullfighting have been produced by anthropologists who adopted the lenses of cultural relativism. Anthropologists have generally privileged tradition and treated the anti-bullfighting movement as an insignificant or, as it has grown strong, a troubling aspect of bullfighting culture, mentioning it only in passing. Anthropology as a field emerged in the midst of a romantic rebellion (Shweder, 1991) that found meaning in the traditions criticized by enlightenment philosophers. Traditions as repositories of cultural differences have been respected for the sake of diversity as well as, from the ethical perspective, realms of otherness. The relativistic attitude within the academy, and especially in the field of anthropology, understands *objective analysis* as a balanced view and respects difference, that is, tradition rather than movements criticizing them, and in doing so it promotes production of discourses that are often neither objective nor progressive, but rather prejudiced against

progressive social movements opposing oppressive local traditions. Paradoxically, these discourses that claim to be objective because they adopt the other's perspective and to be ethical because they protect otherness may sometimes be subservient to the political ideologies, which use traditions to promote nationalism and social injustice.

Bullfighting and National Identities in Spain by Carrie Douglas (1999) is an example of analysis accomplished from an anthropological perspective. Douglas admits the existence of heated debate on bullfighting, but she privileges a perspective according to which bullfighting is still, as Franco's regime wanted, a unifying element of Spain, where geography and languages change, but the bull is everywhere the same: "It makes the contemporary Spanish state possible by integrating its various parts" (8). This prejudice in favor of bullfighting is even more pronounced in the article by Alberto Bouroncle (2000) where anti-bullfighting is only mentioned *passim*. Bouroncle's vision of bullfighting as a factor of all provincial allegiance to the Spanish state is not only ideologically subservient to the remnants of Francoism but also, in the year of the publication of the article, is simply not true as a fact. Mitchell's *Blood Sport* (1991), although already quite dated, is perhaps the best researched study of the cultural context of bullfighting. It presents an in-depth analysis of the "cultural complex of beliefs and behaviors that sustains [bullfighting]" (2). His research leads him to assert that "bullfighting has been nothing less than a microcosm of the Spanish social order," replicating "almost every feature of the Spanish political system" (132). Mitchell avoids ethical judgments or, having made them, dilutes them through relativistic considerations. He states, for example, that "it is entirely possible that bullfighting is immoral or unethical in some way or in every way. Extreme caution must be exercised, however, when applying personal or abstract moral standards to specific aspects of cultural performances" (2). He explains that if bullfighting is evaluated in terms of the taurine subculture itself, it is impossible to condemn it. Mitchell maintains this ambiguous attitude toward his topic through his whole book, moving back and forth between anti-bullfighting arguments and the alleged "objectivity" of his perspective. His immersion in the "planet of bulls" (2), as he calls the taurine subculture, visibly prevents him from appreciating the change introduced by the growing anti-bullfighting movement, which in 1991 should have been already visible. Like Douglas, he expresses unsubstantiated certainty that for every Spaniard critical of bullfighting there are hundreds who enjoy it. In spite of all this prudence, he is strongly criticized by Sarah Pink, who in *Women and Bullfighting: Gender, Sex and the Consumption of the Tradition* (1997) accuses him of essentializing and orientализing Spanish character through its inscription to bullfighting.

The efforts undertaken by various Spanish provinces, and especially Catalonia, to disassociate themselves symbolically from the bull are analyzed in the insightful article by the renown anthropologist Stanley Brandes, "Taurophiles and Taurophobes" (2009). Although Brandes devotes attention mainly to anti-bullfighting as a means of asserting Catalan and other separatisms, he describes the search for a symbolic mascot different from the bull in the Spanish autonomous provinces, recognizing the broader significance of the growing moral objections of the people and the effects of activism in the animal rights movement as important components of changes in Spaniards' self-perception. Brandes's article is to the best of my knowledge the only publication to date on anti-bullfighting that presents the dynamics of change of attitudes towards bullfighting in Spain written by an American anthropologist. He claims that for a majority of the contemporary Spaniards, "a blood sport like bullfighting seems particularly anachronistic" because "to a growing segment of the Spanish population, anything that sets the country apart from the rest of the continent is undeserving of preservation" (789).

Not only Franco's cultural propaganda but also Hispanism critical of Franco's politics and relativistic anthropology have constructed the vision of "wild" Spain that most of today's Spaniards want to get rid of. Hand in hand with certain discourses of Spanish politics both on the right and the left, artists such as Lorca, Alberti, and possibly Almodóvar, as well as most literary critics like Hernández who glorify their visions, still propagate Spanish culture as one of bullfighting, violent passions, irrationality, desires, and death as a mark of Spanish difference understood as a sort of spiritual superiority. At the same time, however, Spain has undergone a great number of changes. If it is debatable to what extent its reality had ever corresponded to the Prescott paradigm or Castro's theories, nowadays there are even more reasons to question these past discourses of the national culture in Spain. It seems inappropriate that in American classrooms students are still being informed that bullfighting is a true expression of Spanish soul, while in Spain over seventy percent express no interest in bullfighting (Gallup, 2002; "Comparativa ICSA-Gallup," 2009; Lafora, 2004; Abend and Pingree, 2007; and others).²⁴ A number of grassroots organizations against animal cruelty are founded by regular citizens, and anti-bullfighting protests happen all over Spain. The discourses of the field have had a limited sensitivity to these changes in the culture.

Giorgina Dopico Black (2010) paid attention to the anti-bullfighting debate but reduced its significance to that of Catalan nationalism. Dopico Black's article in the *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies* is nonetheless signifi-

24. See note 12 for more on polls on bullfighting in Spain.

cant as a call for attention to the question of the animal in Spanish cultural studies. Two other scholars note the significance of the anti-bullfighting movement in Spanish culture: John Beusterien and William Viestenz. Beusterien's book *Canines in Cervantes and Velázquez: An Animal Studies Reading of Early Modern Spain* elegantly highlights the significance of the animal question in the sixteenth century and shows that even then there existed certain opposition to bullfighting. Viestenz's article, entitled "Sins of the Flesh: Bullfighting as a Model of Power" (2013), surveys recent debates on bullfighting in Spain and does so in reference to Agamben's and La Capra's theoretical frameworks. The article discusses Martín-Santos' *Tiempo de silencio* (1962) and Juan Goytisolo's *Señas de identidad* (1966) as reflections on traumatic experiences of violence connected to bullfighting in Spanish postwar history. It concludes with analysis of Salvador Espriu's collection of poetry *La pell de brau* (1960), which calls for revising the symbolic association with the bull in Iberian artistic production. In his forthcoming article "The Bull Also Rises: The Political Redemption of the Beast in *La pell de brau* by Salvador Espriu" (*Hispanic Issues*), Viestenz connects "redeeming the bull" from the category of "the beast" to that of "a political animal" to the consideration of a shift from the discourse of Hispanism to "Iberian Studies." Iberian cultural studies with its focus on diversity of the cultural conceptualizations of life and languages on the Iberian Peninsula questions the paradigmatic discourse of Hispanism related to spirituality, death, and bullfighting. Scholars related to this reforming movement in the field show more openness toward the significance of the nonhuman life in general. Also beyond Iberian Studies, in recent years various young scholars such as Luis Martín-Estudillo, Paul Begin, Sara Brenneis, Luis Prádanos, Daniel Ares López, and others have undertaken criticism that includes the perspectives of animal studies and environmental humanities.²⁵

Jesús Torrecilla's *España exótica* (2004) deserves a special mention as a pioneering effort not only to recognize bullfighting as a cultural problem but also to openly take a stand in analyzing it. Torrecilla's sympathies are visibly with the anti-bullfighting movement as he boldly states that "las corridas de toros son un espectáculo anacrónico y primitivo. . . . El nacionalismo valora lo que considera propio y lo hace sin restricciones ni distinguos" (151) (bullfighting is an anachronistic and primitive spectacle. . . . Nationalism values its own without any restrictions and distinctions). Torrecilla evokes

25. *Hispanic Issues* has recently published a volume of essays written from environmental perspectives and focused on human/animal relations. A Northeast Modern Language Association (2014) panel on environmental approaches to Spanish culture received so many graduate students' abstracts that it was changed into a roundtable seminar.

an article by Galdós published in *La Nación* in 1868 where the famous novelist considers bullfighting within the dichotomy between nationalism and modernization. After considering keeping bullfighting as the last resort of Spanish authenticity threatened by foreign fashion, Galdós rejects this possibility, stating that “más vale parecer extranjeros en España que bárbaros en Europa” (qtd. in Torrecilla, 2004, 144) (It is better to seem a stranger in Spain than a barbarian in Europe). Torrecilla comments that this dichotomy is debatably false, as the modernity has various faces, and he gives more meaning to the fact that the defense of bullfighting has turned into a “national crusade” because at its heart lies wounded national pride and resentment toward the rest of Europe (153). The popularity of bullfighting was a result of an “inferiority complex” that must be given due attention. In *Le phantom de la liberté* (1974), Buñuel develops a similar intuition of Spaniards’ traumatic relation with France as comparable to the predicament of animals. It is to this surprising comparison that I turn now.